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name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution
id: 24962154-9524-11ec-9333-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2022-02-23'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol
handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when
invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first
time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions,
as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process.
data_source:
- Windows Security 4688
search:
selection1:
process.cmd_line|contains:
- about
- javascript
- vbscript
process.file.name: mshta.exe
condition: (selection1)
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
this behavior, triggering a false positive.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious MSHTA Activity
- Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 80
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ executing with inline HTA,
indicative of defense evasion.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.005
- T1218
observable: []
product:
- Splunk Behavioral Analytics
required_fields: []
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
risk_score: 80
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
source: WinEventLog:Security