cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml

name: CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter
id: 54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122
version: 4
date: '2023-12-27'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe
  /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and
  terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in
  adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell
  or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious
  command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process="*
  /c*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
  and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
  telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
  you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
  Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
  be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
  the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
  data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
  names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code
  in any environment. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
tags:
  analytic_story:
  - AsyncRAT
  - Winter Vivern
  - WhisperGate
  - Living Off The Land
  - DarkGate Malware
  - ProxyNotShell
  - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
  - NjRAT
  - RedLine Stealer
  - Rhysida Ransomware
  - IcedID
  - Chaos Ransomware
  - PlugX
  - Azorult
  - Qakbot
  - Hermetic Wiper
  - Warzone RAT
  - DarkCrystal RAT
  - CISA AA23-347A
  - Data Destruction
  asset_type: Endpoint
  automated_detection_testing: passed
  confidence: 50
  cve:
  - CVE-2021-44228
  impact: 60
  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
    on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.
  mitre_attack_id:
  - T1059.003
  - T1059
  observable:
  - name: dest
    type: Endpoint
    role:
    - Victim
  - name: user
    type: User
    role:
    - Victim
  product:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
  required_fields:
  - _time
  - Processes.parent_process_name
  - Processes.parent_process
  - Processes.process_name
  - Processes.process_id
  - Processes.process
  - Processes.dest
  - Processes.user
  - Processes.process_id
  - Processes.parent_process_id
  risk_score: 30
  security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
  attack_data:
  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log
    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog