detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml

name: Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process
id: bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114
version: 2
date: '2023-11-07'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This
  particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products.
  Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process
  is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation,
  identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional
  suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly.
  regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe
  and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe
  by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
  and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
  telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
  you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
  Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
  be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
  the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
  data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
  names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe
  may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments,
  or process lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
tags:
  analytic_story:
  - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
  - Living Off The Land
  asset_type: Endpoint
  confidence: 80
  impact: 80
  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$  was identified
    on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.
  mitre_attack_id:
  - T1218
  - T1218.009
  observable:
  - name: user
    type: User
    role:
    - Victim
  - name: dest
    type: Hostname
    role:
    - Victim
  - name: parent_process_name
    type: Process
    role:
    - Parent Process
  - name: process_name
    type: Process
    role:
    - Child Process
  product:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
  required_fields:
  - _time
  - Processes.parent_process_name
  - Processes.dest
  - Processes.user
  - Processes.parent_process
  - Processes.process_name
  - Processes.process
  - Processes.process_id
  - Processes.parent_process_id
  risk_score: 64
  security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
  attack_data:
  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog