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name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage
id: e8b74268-5454-11ec-a799-acde48001122
version: 3
date: '2021-12-03'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by
`rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are
specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may
list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which
is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware
event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue
investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.
data_source:
- Windows Security 4688
search:
selection1:
process.cmd_line|contains:
- --multi-thread-streams
- --transfers
- --auto-confirm
- --ignore-existing
- --no-check-certificate
- --progress
- --config
- ftp
- pcloud
- mega
- copy
process.file.name: rclone.exe
condition: (selection1)
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is restricted to
the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/
tags:
analytic_story:
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Ransomware
- Insider Threat
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 50
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to connect to a
remote cloud service to move files or folders.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1020
observable: []
product:
- Splunk Behavioral Analytics
required_fields: []
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
risk_score: 35
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log
source: WinEventLog:Security