Repository navigation
Closed
Labels
app/idPackage/app: id (pkgs/ or apps/ in this repo)Package/app: id (pkgs/ or apps/ in this repo)kind/designA design proposal (design-architect): multi-step, phased, decision-bearingA design proposal (design-architect): multi-step, phased, decision-bearingpriority/normalOrdinary priority (the default)Ordinary priority (the default)queue/parkedQueue task is parked (waiting on CI, time, or an event)Queue task is parked (waiting on CI, time, or an event)status/parkedDeliberately paused with a recorded resume conditionDeliberately paused with a recorded resume conditionstatus/triagedTriaged and routed (see agent note)Triaged and routed (see agent note)status:donetask/small-fixQueue packet kind: bounded fix with reproduction and targeted testsQueue packet kind: bounded fix with reproduction and targeted testswork/assignedQueue worker lifecycle stateQueue worker lifecycle state
Description
Part of the worlds design program: #5955. Statements S24–S27 of the 2026-11-04 brief.
Requirement (Drew, in substance)
Our side of the bargain is narrow, and it is the whole safety story:
- Ticks, sessions, or gas stay below a certain amount. Budgets are platform-enforced, not author-promised.
- The platform side is solid — it can't be exploited to do more than it's meant to. The capability ceiling is a security boundary, not a convention.
- Users are aware of what could be done. Awareness (registry listing, permission prompts) is a load-bearing part of the model, not decoration.
- Within those bounds — disk size and the rest — users can pull whatever libraries they want. No additional gatekeeping is implied by this design.
Design points to settle
- The budget vocabulary: per-tick gas, per-session totals, per-world aggregate, disk quota per world / per user / per library cache. Which are hard kills, which are throttles, which are bills (see the compile-economics child of #5955)?
- Observability: what does a world author / server admin see when a budget trips — and what does the user whose function tripped it see? (The brief's program framing names observability as a first-class axis.)
- Exploit-resistance review surface: enumerate the platform functions as an attack surface; for each, what bounds it (path sandboxing, network egress rules, allocation limits). This is the checklist the "can't be exploited" claim will be audited against.
- Failure containment: a world that blows its budget must not degrade co-resident worlds on the same server.
Related
- Per-function gas/timeout research child of #5955
- Writer-set authority (adjacent boundary): #5545
- Sandbox implementation today:
pkgs/id/src/sandbox.rs; capability catalogpkgs/id/crates/id-core/src/world_caps.rs
Done looks like
A design doc: the budget set with enforcement semantics, the observability surface for each budget, and the platform attack-surface checklist.
Metadata
Metadata
Assignees
Labels
app/idPackage/app: id (pkgs/ or apps/ in this repo)Package/app: id (pkgs/ or apps/ in this repo)kind/designA design proposal (design-architect): multi-step, phased, decision-bearingA design proposal (design-architect): multi-step, phased, decision-bearingpriority/normalOrdinary priority (the default)Ordinary priority (the default)queue/parkedQueue task is parked (waiting on CI, time, or an event)Queue task is parked (waiting on CI, time, or an event)status/parkedDeliberately paused with a recorded resume conditionDeliberately paused with a recorded resume conditionstatus/triagedTriaged and routed (see agent note)Triaged and routed (see agent note)status:donetask/small-fixQueue packet kind: bounded fix with reproduction and targeted testsQueue packet kind: bounded fix with reproduction and targeted testswork/assignedQueue worker lifecycle stateQueue worker lifecycle state
Activity
developing-today commentedon Nov 5, 2026
CODE-1628
dezren39 commentedon Nov 5, 2026
Ruling — C2 capability posture, server-invariant implications (Drew, 2026-11-04 23:57 CST; primary record on #5958).
Correction to the program's earlier working interpretation: the brief does not supersede the shipped default. The completely isolated seccomp policy (no fs open, no sockets) remains the default and is a standing invariant for server design.
What changes is additive: an opt-in file+network capability tier is to be investigated/built, with these invariant-level constraints — capabilities off by default on servers; publishing of worlds using them is first-party only for now; the mechanism must be built so it could be enabled for anyone later, with general enablement gated on testing and refining how the platform wrangles and controls such capabilities. Invariant/bounds design here should cover containment for that tier when enabled, without weakening the default isolation.
dezren39 commentedon Nov 5, 2026
🤖 Agent note · triaged — task 10331 (queue repo-health-code-pilot, lane code-f)
04f78696abfbdf6567f58e623d80520436f002fa(2026-11-05, this triage): the implementation surface the doc must ground in exists —pkgs/id/src/sandbox.rs(108,450 bytes) andpkgs/id/crates/id-core/src/world_caps.rs(79,834 bytes). No PR referencing id: design: server-side invariants — tick/session/gas/disk bounds, budget observability, platform exploit resistance #5962 exists (fresh PR search, all states). No held / user/owned / do-not-merge / do-not-auto-edit labels.99 remaining items
design(id): server-side invariants for #5962