Reject unwireable cross-job provider-env macros on engine.env (follow-up to #1372)

[jamesadevine]

Follow-up to #1372.

#1372 is fixed by adding the typed engine.provider (BYOK) block with compiler-owned in-job Azure CLI token minting: a same-job secret AW_PROVIDER_BEARER_TOKEN is wired into COPILOT_PROVIDER_API_KEY (the credential env var the AWF api-proxy sidecar actually reads and forwards as Authorization: Bearer <value>), so a Foundry token resolves at runtime. That change is additive: the raw engine.env COPILOT_PROVIDER_* passthrough (including the broken cross-job $(Setup.FOUNDRY_TOKEN) macro) still compiles.

This issue tracks two deferred hardenings of the legacy raw engine.env provider path (both out of scope for the additive #1372 fix, both low urgency since engine.provider is now the sanctioned surface).

1. Reject the unwireable cross-job $(<Job>.<Var>) macro

Reject the cross-job output-macro form on raw engine.env provider keys at compile time, with an actionable error pointing users to engine.provider (or a same-job / pipeline / variable-group $(VAR) secret).

Scope:

• In validate_engine_env_entry (src/engine.rs), for provider-expr keys, classify the macro: allow single-identifier $(VAR) (resolves same-job/pipeline), reject dotted cross-job $(a.b) (never resolves in a step env: block -> empty -> managed-identity 403).
• Keep ${{ }} / $[...] / ##vso[ rejections unchanged.
• Tests + docs note.

Explicitly NOT a codemod: rewriting the old $(Setup.*) + setup: mint pattern into engine.provider would require parsing an arbitrary inline az bash script (fragile, cannot produce a complete block); there is no live in-repo usage; and the pattern is already runtime-broken. The compile-time error is the migration nudge.

2. Drop COPILOT_PROVIDER_BEARER_TOKEN from the raw-env allowlist

The AWF api-proxy sidecar (which ado-aw always enables for BYOK) has no COPILOT_PROVIDER_BEARER_TOKEN concept — its BYOK credential is read exclusively from COPILOT_PROVIDER_API_KEY (verified against AWF v0.27.9 containers/api-proxy/providers/copilot.js + provider-env-constants.js, whose COPILOT_ENV lists only GITHUB_TOKEN, PROVIDER_API_KEY, PROVIDER_TYPE, PROVIDER_BASE_URL, API_TARGET, API_BASE_PATH).

Yet COPILOT_PROVIDER_BEARER_TOKEN is still listed in COPILOT_PROVIDER_EXPR_ENV_KEYS and COPILOT_BYOM_CREDENTIAL_ENV_KEYS (src/engine.rs) — carried over from #1264. A user who sets COPILOT_PROVIDER_BEARER_TOKEN directly in engine.env would have it --exclude-env'd from the container (so no leak) but never consumed by the sidecar -> silently unauthenticated (same 403 class). The engine.provider.token path was corrected to plumb COPILOT_PROVIDER_API_KEY instead; the raw-env allowlist should follow.

Scope:

• Remove COPILOT_PROVIDER_BEARER_TOKEN from COPILOT_PROVIDER_EXPR_ENV_KEYS and COPILOT_BYOM_CREDENTIAL_ENV_KEYS (src/engine.rs), so the raw-env path only advertises the keys the sidecar actually reads.
• If retained for any non-sidecar/direct-CLI edge case, at minimum document that it is inert through the api-proxy and emit a warning.
• Update docs/engine.md + site/.../engine.mdx (the engine.env exception note currently lists COPILOT_PROVIDER_BEARER_TOKEN) and tests.

[github-actions]

🏷️ Triaged

Labeled as enhancement, rust, agentic-workflows.

Why: This is a planned compile-time guardrail addition (not a regression) that adds validation logic to validate_engine_env_entry in src/engine.rs to reject unwireable cross-job $(a.b) macro forms on provider-env keys — scoped Rust compiler work that directly affects engine.env front-matter authoring behavior.

_{Automated triage — a maintainer can adjust labels anytime.}

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