Describe the bug
server_url_validator is the default SSRF guard for OpenAPI plugin calls (allow_private_network_access defaults to False), and it classifies IPv4 by explicit octet ranges and IPv6 by a short list of properties. Two categories fall outside both:
168.63.129.16 — Azure's WireServer / platform channel, reachable from every Azure VM. It's a publicly routable address, so none of the _try_classify_ipv4 branches match it.
- IPv6 addresses that carry an IPv4 target inside them.
_try_classify_ipv6 unwraps ::ffff: via ipv4_mapped, but NAT64, 6to4 and Teredo encodings aren't decoded.
The URL an OpenAPI plugin ends up calling is influenced by the model (server variables, path parameters), which is what makes this the SSRF surface the module exists for.
To Reproduce
import asyncio
from semantic_kernel.connectors.openapi_plugin.server_url_validator import validate_server_url
asyncio.run(validate_server_url("https://168.63.129.16/machine/")) # returns
asyncio.run(validate_server_url("https://[64:ff9b::169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/")) # returns
Full sweep on main @ 7d885dd:
| address |
result |
category reported |
169.254.169.254 (AWS/GCP/Azure/OCI/DO IMDS) |
blocked |
link-local |
169.254.170.2 (AWS ECS task creds) |
blocked |
link-local |
169.254.170.23 (AWS EKS Pod Identity) |
blocked |
link-local |
169.254.42.42 (Scaleway) |
blocked |
link-local |
100.100.100.200 (Alibaba) |
blocked |
carrier-grade NAT |
192.0.0.192 (Oracle Cloud Classic) |
blocked |
reserved |
168.63.129.16 (Azure WireServer) |
allowed |
— |
| IPv6 form |
result |
::ffff:169.254.169.254 (IPv4-mapped) |
blocked |
::1, fd00:ec2::254 |
blocked |
64:ff9b::169.254.169.254 (NAT64 well-known, RFC 6052) |
allowed |
2002:a9fe:a9fe:: (6to4, RFC 3056) |
allowed |
2001:0:4136:e378:8000:63bf:3fff:fdd2 (Teredo, RFC 4380) |
allowed |
Expected behavior
168.63.129.16 blocked regardless of the private-range classification, and IPv6 forms carrying an embedded IPv4 decoded to that IPv4 before classification.
The Azure one can't be caught by range logic — it needs an explicit metadata denylist, checked before allow_private_network_access returns early, since "let me reach my own network" and "let me reach the host agent's credential endpoint" aren't the same request.
NAT64 needs the 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48 prefixes decoded per RFC 6052 §2.2; 6to4 takes the IPv4 from bits 16–47; Teredo's is the low 32 bits XOR'd with all-ones.
Platform
- OS: Linux
- Python: 3.10.12
- Semantic Kernel:
main @ 7d885dd (python)
Additional context
Reachability varies by deployment — NAT64 needs a gateway on the path, and 6to4/Teredo relays are largely retired, so those three are defence-in-depth rather than universally exploitable. 168.63.129.16 is different: it is directly reachable on any Azure VM with no special network setup, which is where this repo's users are most likely to be running.
The IPv4-mapped unwrapping in try_categorize_non_public_address is already the right shape for the IPv6 side; the other encodings would slot in next to it.
Describe the bug
server_url_validatoris the default SSRF guard for OpenAPI plugin calls (allow_private_network_accessdefaults toFalse), and it classifies IPv4 by explicit octet ranges and IPv6 by a short list of properties. Two categories fall outside both:168.63.129.16— Azure's WireServer / platform channel, reachable from every Azure VM. It's a publicly routable address, so none of the_try_classify_ipv4branches match it._try_classify_ipv6unwraps::ffff:viaipv4_mapped, but NAT64, 6to4 and Teredo encodings aren't decoded.The URL an OpenAPI plugin ends up calling is influenced by the model (server variables, path parameters), which is what makes this the SSRF surface the module exists for.
To Reproduce
Full sweep on
main@ 7d885dd:169.254.169.254(AWS/GCP/Azure/OCI/DO IMDS)169.254.170.2(AWS ECS task creds)169.254.170.23(AWS EKS Pod Identity)169.254.42.42(Scaleway)100.100.100.200(Alibaba)192.0.0.192(Oracle Cloud Classic)168.63.129.16(Azure WireServer)::ffff:169.254.169.254(IPv4-mapped)::1,fd00:ec2::25464:ff9b::169.254.169.254(NAT64 well-known, RFC 6052)2002:a9fe:a9fe::(6to4, RFC 3056)2001:0:4136:e378:8000:63bf:3fff:fdd2(Teredo, RFC 4380)Expected behavior
168.63.129.16blocked regardless of the private-range classification, and IPv6 forms carrying an embedded IPv4 decoded to that IPv4 before classification.The Azure one can't be caught by range logic — it needs an explicit metadata denylist, checked before
allow_private_network_accessreturns early, since "let me reach my own network" and "let me reach the host agent's credential endpoint" aren't the same request.NAT64 needs the
64:ff9b::/96and64:ff9b:1::/48prefixes decoded per RFC 6052 §2.2; 6to4 takes the IPv4 from bits 16–47; Teredo's is the low 32 bits XOR'd with all-ones.Platform
main@ 7d885dd (python)Additional context
Reachability varies by deployment — NAT64 needs a gateway on the path, and 6to4/Teredo relays are largely retired, so those three are defence-in-depth rather than universally exploitable.
168.63.129.16is different: it is directly reachable on any Azure VM with no special network setup, which is where this repo's users are most likely to be running.The IPv4-mapped unwrapping in
try_categorize_non_public_addressis already the right shape for the IPv6 side; the other encodings would slot in next to it.