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In pkgjs we’re going to have an emeritus team, and anyone who is not included in the list in nodejs/package-maintenance#642 will be moved there, unless they are a TSC member or part of the moderation team.
Currently, the @nodejs organization contains 69 inactive1 users. That's roughly a fifth of the entire organization2.
Footnotes
1. A user who has not interacted (commenting, committing, etc) on a repository in the organization in the past 12 months. [↩](#user-content-fnref-1-861f13ae9ab3acaf96c3a793855368f5) [↩2](#user-content-fnref-1-2-861f13ae9ab3acaf96c3a793855368f5)
2. As of writing, there are 346 members of the [@nodejs](https://github.com/nodejs) organization. [↩](#user-content-fnref-2-861f13ae9ab3acaf96c3a793855368f5)
Inactive users merely being in the org is immaterial - the only thing that matters is if inactive users have permissions that are dangerous to hold, namely, Write or higher on repos (and in some repos, Write might not even matter). Can you filter down to only those users who have such access?
Inactive users merely being in the org is immaterial - the only thing that matters is if inactive users have permissions that are dangerous to hold, namely, Write or higher on repos (and in some repos, Write might not even matter). Can you filter down to only those users who have such access?
It's not. There are several things that every member of the organization has access to:
Then the permissions changes I'd recommend is making mere org membership not automatically grant any permissions. (although 4, 5, and 6 imo aren't really a risk for known actors) 2, for example - only collaborators should have write access.
Activity
bjohansebas commentedon Jan 9, 2026
In pkgjs we’re going to have an emeritus team, and anyone who is not included in the list in nodejs/package-maintenance#642 will be moved there, unless they are a TSC member or part of the moderation team.
aslo see #1020
richardlau commentedon Jan 9, 2026
For the nodejs list:
node-forward-build is owned by the Build WG and is still in use today. Things will break if it is removed from the org.
Some of the identified users are members of the organization for notification purposes.
For example (since these are IBMers who I know are still involved with Node.js):
(FWIW nodejs/node#61308 was opened specifically for the IBM platform teams but the above names were not suggested for removal/clean up.)
avivkeller commentedon Jan 9, 2026
Noted. I identified the users with a basic script to fetch members -> check interactions -> log usernames. I know the list likely has false positives.
ljharb commentedon Jan 11, 2026
Inactive users merely being in the org is immaterial - the only thing that matters is if inactive users have permissions that are dangerous to hold, namely, Write or higher on repos (and in some repos, Write might not even matter). Can you filter down to only those users who have such access?
mcollina commentedon Jan 11, 2026
Our most important assets (nodejs/node) has already a script that does this check.
avivkeller commentedon Jan 12, 2026
It's not. There are several things that every member of the organization has access to:
pull_requestworkflows without authorization.etc
ljharb commentedon Jan 12, 2026
Then the permissions changes I'd recommend is making mere org membership not automatically grant any permissions. (although 4, 5, and 6 imo aren't really a risk for known actors) 2, for example - only collaborators should have write access.