This is an actively developed, pre-1.0 application. Only the latest released version receives security fixes.

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting (preferred) — open the Security tab of this repository and click "Report a vulnerability".

Please include:

• a description of the issue and its impact,
• steps to reproduce (a minimal config.json / endpoint setup if relevant),
• the version (copilot-proxy --version or the tray "About" / settings).

You can expect an initial acknowledgement within a few days. Please give a reasonable window for a fix before any public disclosure.

A few properties are intentional and worth knowing when assessing a report:

• The API key is in-memory only. It is wrapped in secrecy::SecretString, never written to config.json, never logged, and never returned to the webview. It must be re-entered after restarting the app.
• The proxy is loopback-only by default (127.0.0.1). Because it injects your upstream API key into every forwarded request, binding beyond loopback is an explicit opt-in ("expose to network") gated by a self-generated gateway token required for non-loopback peers.
• Inputs are validated on entry and on load. The listen address (strict host whitelist) and endpoint URL (rejects bare /v1 and user:pass@ credentials) are validated both in the UI and when config.json is read at startup; an invalid hand-edited value falls back to a safe default.
• The settings webview loads only local, static assets under a restrictive 'self' CSP — no remote scripts, no CDNs.

If you find a way to defeat any of these properties (e.g. key leakage to disk or logs, an unauthenticated non-loopback request reaching the upstream, or command injection via a config value), that is in scope — please report it.