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Chrome plugin, browser and computer use refuse to interact with certain sites. #29343

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Description

@joshp123

What version of the Codex App are you using (From “About Codex” dialog)?

Version 26.616.51431

What subscription do you have?

pro €225/month

What platform is your computer?

No response

What issue are you seeing?

Codex silently refuses to load certain sites using the Chrome plugin.

there seems to be a server-side blacklist of sites that Codex refuses to load. When you try and access one of these sites, the browser plugin throws an error:

Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
Reason: Browser Use is not permitted on https://detail.1688.com.

these sites aren't malicious or don't seem to be against TOS or anything: normal e-commerce sites such as Taobao or 1688.com.
futhermore, this isn't documented anywhere either.

Philosophically, having a web browser that decides - server side - which websites it can and can't load, without any transparency on this, it's not great. I could (grudgingly) understand if the sites are malicious/pornographic/illegal/etc, but these are genuine huge e-commerce sites - the Western equivalent of blocking Amazon or Walmart. More broadly, silently blocking sites in a non-transparent/undocumented way doesn't feel right either.

It seems like you ALSO can't even use Computer Use on Chrome if a tab is open from one of the "non-permitted" websites:

mcp__computer_use.get_app_state({
  "app": "Google Chrome"
})
// returns:
[{"type":"text","text":"This session has been stopped because Computer Use is not allowed on the current browser URL. Stop your work and send a final message noting why the session has been ended. Note that Computer Use is not allowed on this URL even if the user navigates to it themselves."}]

Obviously I could monkey-patch around this by modifying the javascript plugin or computer use.... but that's not an okay workaround either. Computer use, Chrome, and the Browser plugin should just work on all (legal) sites.

What steps can reproduce the bug?

Feedback ID: 019ee97a-589a-7670-9b4c-a7eadac555ba

What is the expected behavior?

The built in plugins do not run a server-side check to see if users are permitted to look at a certain site or not.

Additional information

Codex investigated the issue further, a brief summary (before we get the clanker to attach a big slop comment of everything it found):

  • On every request, the Chrome plugin will make a request to https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/aura/site_status, if this endpoint returns something, the request will be blocked
  • chrome plugin code: /Users/<me>/.codex/plugins/cache/openai-bundled/chrome/26.616.51431/scripts/browser-client.mjs:3234

Activity

  1. added
    appIssues related to the Codex desktop app
    on Jun 21, 2026
  2. github-actions commented on Jun 21, 2026

    @github-actions
    Contributor
  3. joshp123 commented on Jun 21, 2026

    @joshp123
    Author

    here's a bunch of slop from the clanker explaining the issue in more detail, included a list of blocked and not blocked sites. (i told it to check a bunch of chinese and western e-commerce sites, and a bunch of semi-dodgy sites to see what it found. you get the idea).

    Additional Browser Use site-policy matrix from local Chrome-plugin testing
    
    Additional evidence from local Codex Chrome Browser Use testing.
    
    Environment:
    - Date: 2026-06-21
    - Codex app / plugin runtime: 26.616.51431
    - Browser surface: Chrome extension Browser Use
    - Local browser client path observed: /Users/<me>/.codex/plugins/cache/openai-bundled/chrome/26.616.51431/scripts/browser-client.mjs
    - Relevant minified code pointer observed locally: browser-client.mjs:3234
    
    Local code-path observation:
    - Browser Use builds a request to https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/aura/site_status.
    - It sends site_url, url_request_source=codex_browser_use, and available turn/session metadata.
    - The local bundle does not appear to contain a simple hardcoded list of these domains.
    - If the backend says the site is blocked, throwIfBlocksUrl(...) throws:
      "Browser Use is not permitted on <display URL>"
    - Metadata commands such as tab listing/claiming/title/url can still work, which explains why an already-open blocked tab can expose title/url while DOM/screenshot/evaluate/navigation fail.
    - Raw CDP is separately gated, and the thrown message explicitly says not to work around the block using raw CDP or alternate browser surfaces.
    
    Test method:
    - Used temporary Chrome Browser Use tabs and closed/finalized them after testing.
    - Broad sweep: tab.goto(url), tab.url(), tab.title(), and where not policy-blocked, a read-only page-context check via tab.playwright.evaluate(() => location.href).
    - Semi-dodgy sweep intentionally avoided page text/title extraction and used navigation, current URL, and location.href only.
    - "Allowed" below means Browser Use policy did not block the page. It does not mean the site itself was usable; some allowed pages still showed Cloudflare, geo blocks, access-denied pages, login walls, or site-side antibot friction.
    - Sensitive / dodgy domains below are intentionally broken with <deletethis> so they do not render as links.
    
    Confirmed Browser Use policy blocks:
    
    Normal ecommerce / sourcing / China-adjacent:
    - 1688.com: www, login, m, s, and detail offer pages blocked.
    - taobao.com: www, world, login, and item pages blocked.
    - aliexpress.com: www and login blocked.
    - pinduoduo.com blocked.
    - you.163.com blocked.
    - dhgate.com blocked.
    - pan.baidu.com blocked.
    - weixin.qq.com blocked.
    - pay.weixin.qq.com blocked.
    - mega.nz blocked.
    - tokopedia.com blocked.
    
    Semi-dodgy western / sensitive categories:
    - Adult video / subscription:
      - pornhub<deletethis>.com
      - xvideos<deletethis>.com
      - xnxx<deletethis>.com
      - xhamster<deletethis>.com
      - onlyfans<deletethis>.com
    - Torrent / index:
      - thepiratebay<deletethis>.org
      - 1337x<deletethis>.to
      - yts<deletethis>.mx
      - nyaa<deletethis>.si
      - torrentgalaxy<deletethis>.to
      - rutracker<deletethis>.org
    - Repack / crack:
      - fitgirl-repacks<deletethis>.site
      - dodi-repacks<deletethis>.site
      - steamunlocked<deletethis>.net
      - igg-games<deletethis>.com
    - ROM / emulation-adjacent:
      - vimm<deletethis>.net
      - cdromance<deletethis>.org
    - Streaming piracy-ish:
      - fmovies<deletethis>.to
    - Shadow libraries / papers:
      - libgen<deletethis>.is
      - sci-hub<deletethis>.se
    - File lockers:
      - rapidgator<deletethis>.net
      - 4shared<deletethis>.com
    - Cracking / leak forums:
      - cracked<deletethis>.io
      - hackforums<deletethis>.net
    
    Important Browser Use policy ALLOWED comparators:
    
    China search / portal / social:
    - baidu.com, www.baidu.com, m.baidu.com, www.baidu.com search result URLs
    - tieba.baidu.com
    - map.baidu.com
    - sogou.com
    - so.com
    - sm.cn
    - qq.com
    - im.qq.com
    - weibo.com
    - douyin.com
    - kuaishou.com
    - bilibili.com
    - zhihu.com
    - douban.com
    
    China ecommerce / sourcing / travel / local services:
    - alibaba.com
    - login.alibaba.com
    - tmall.com
    - detail.tmall.com (Browser Use allowed; site redirected to a Tmall error page)
    - jd.com (redirected to global.jd.com)
    - global.jd.com
    - jd.hk
    - mobile.yangkeduo.com
    - suning.com
    - vip.com
    - dangdang.com
    - gome.com.cn
    - goofish.com
    - xiaohongshu.com
    - dewu.com
    - mogujie.com / mogu.com
    - weidian.com
    - youzan.com
    - kwaixiaodian.com
    - meituan.com
    - dianping.com
    - ele.me
    - ctrip.com
    - qunar.com
    - made-in-china.com
    - globalsources.com
    - banggood.com
    - geekbuying.com
    - lightinthebox.com
    - chinavasion.com
    - temu.com
    - shein.com
    - yesstyle.com
    - shopcider.com
    
    China payment / cloud:
    - alipay.com
    - auth.alipay.com
    - global.alipay.com
    - unionpayintl.com
    - alibabacloud.com
    - tencentcloud.com
    - cloud.baidu.com
    - volcengine.com
    
    Western ecommerce / marketplaces:
    - Amazon NL/US/DE/UK
    - eBay / eBay UK
    - Etsy
    - Walmart
    - Target
    - Best Buy
    - Costco
    - Home Depot (Browser Use allowed; site showed Access Denied)
    - Lowe's
    - Wayfair
    - Newegg
    - B&H
    - Apple Store
    - Google Store
    - Microsoft Store (Browser Use allowed; Microsoft error page)
    - Nike
    - Adidas
    - Zalando NL
    - ASOS
    - H&M
    - IKEA NL
    - Bol.com
    - Coolblue
    - MediaMarkt NL
    - Marktplaats
    - 2dehands
    - Kleinanzeigen
    - Vinted
    - Facebook Marketplace
    - Gumtree
    - Craigslist
    - Horeca.com
    - XXLhoreca
    - Metro
    - Carrefour FR
    - Auchan FR
    - Fnac
    - Cdiscount
    - Decathlon NL
    - Bauhaus
    - Hornbach NL
    - OBI DE
    - PayPal
    - Stripe Checkout
    - Shopify
    - Booking.com
    - Airbnb
    - Uber Eats
    - Deliveroo
    - Just Eat Takeaway
    - DoorDash (Browser Use allowed; Cloudflare page)
    - Instacart
    
    Global ecommerce:
    - shopee.sg
    - lazada.sg
    - rakuten.co.jp
    - rakuten.com (Browser Use allowed; geogating page)
    - jp.mercari.com
    - mercari.com
    - Yahoo Japan auctions/shopping (Browser Use allowed; EEA notice)
    - allegro.pl
    - ozon.ru (Browser Use allowed; antibot challenge page)
    - wildberries.ru (Browser Use allowed; challenge/interstitial)
    - mercadolibre.com
    - olx.com
    
    File / cloud storage:
    - Google Drive
    - Dropbox
    - OneDrive
    - iCloud
    - Box
    - WeTransfer
    - MediaFire
    
    Social / messaging:
    - Facebook
    - Instagram
    - X / x.com
    - Reddit
    - TikTok
    - YouTube
    - Telegram Web
    - WhatsApp Web
    - Discord
    - LinkedIn
    
    Banking / finance / crypto:
    - Chase
    - Bank of America
    - Wells Fargo
    - Revolut
    - Wise
    - Coinbase
    - Binance
    - Kraken
    - Robinhood
    - eToro
    
    Search / government / health / developer / gambling:
    - Google, Bing, DuckDuckGo, Yahoo Search, Yandex, Naver, Daum
    - IRS, GOV.UK, Belastingdienst, DigiD, MijnOverheid, SSA
    - NHS, Mayo Clinic, WebMD, Zocdoc
    - GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, npm, PyPI, Stack Overflow, Cloudflare, AWS, Azure, Vercel, Netlify
    - Bet365, DraftKings Sportsbook, FanDuel, PokerStars, Stake, Polymarket, Kalshi
    
    Semi-dodgy / sensitive allowed comparators:
    - Adult/cam/community:
      - redtube<deletethis>.com
      - youporn<deletethis>.com
      - spankbang<deletethis>.com
      - tube8<deletethis>.com
      - fansly<deletethis>.com
      - manyvids<deletethis>.com
      - chaturbate<deletethis>.com
      - stripchat<deletethis>.com
      - fetlife<deletethis>.com
    - Torrent / streaming / shadow-library-ish comparators:
      - eztvx<deletethis>.to
      - limetorrents<deletethis>.fun
      - 123moviesfree<deletethis> variant redirecting to ww8.123moviesfree<deletethis>.net
      - z-lib<deletethis>.gd
      - romhacking<deletethis>.net
    - File lockers:
      - zippyshare<deletethis>.com
      - nitroflare<deletethis>.com
      - katfile<deletethis>.space
      - gofile<deletethis>.io
      - pixeldrain<deletethis>.com
      - sendspace<deletethis>.com
    - Paste / leak-ish / cracking-ish comparators:
      - pastebin<deletethis>.com
      - rentry<deletethis>.co
      - controlc<deletethis>.com
      - leakbase<deletethis>.io
    - Security dual-use:
      - exploit-db.com
      - shodan.io
      - urlscan.io
      - virustotal.com
      - haveibeenpwned.com
    - Shortener / proxy / VPN / Tor:
      - bit.ly
      - tinyurl.com
      - t.co
      - hide.me
      - proxysite.com
      - torproject.org
      - nordvpn.com
      - mullvad.net
    - Firearms / grey-market comparators:
      - gunbroker<deletethis>.com
      - armslist<deletethis>.com
      - cheaperthandirt<deletethis>.com
    - Pharmacy-ish comparators:
      - hims.com
      - roman.com
      - goodrx.com
      - pharmacychecker.com
    
    Inconclusive / site/network errors, not classified as Browser Use policy blocks in the tested run:
    - login.baidu.com: DNS error
    - xianyu.com: DNS error; goofish.com was allowed
    - kaola.com: DNS error
    - gearbest.com: DNS error
    - fxg.jinritemai.com: navigation timeout in an earlier run
    - bongacams<deletethis>.com: SSL protocol error
    - putlocker<deletethis>.pe: DNS error
    - soap2day<deletethis>.rs: local navigation timeout
    - nulled<deletethis>.to: DNS error
    - breachforums<deletethis>.st: DNS error
    
    Pattern summary:
    - Not a blanket Alibaba Group block: Alibaba, Alibaba login, Tmall, Alibaba Cloud, and Alipay were allowed, while 1688, Taobao, and AliExpress were blocked.
    - Not a broad Chinese ecommerce block: JD, Tmall, Temu, Made-in-China, Global Sources, Weidian, Goofish, Suning, VIP, Dangdang, Ctrip, Qunar, and others were allowed.
    - Not a broad China / Chinese-language block: Baidu search/maps/tieba, Sogou, 360 Search, Shenma, QQ, Weibo, Douyin, Kuaishou, Bilibili, Zhihu, and Douban were allowed.
    - Not a broad file-storage block: Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, iCloud, Box, WeTransfer, and MediaFire were allowed; Baidu Pan and Mega were blocked.
    - Not a broad finance/payment block: banks, crypto exchanges, PayPal/Stripe, Alipay, UnionPay, and Alibaba/Tencent/Baidu cloud sites were allowed; WeChat Pay was blocked.
    - Not a broad Western ecommerce block: the Western ecommerce sample had 0 Browser Use policy blocks.
    - Not a broad regulated-category block: government/identity, health, banking, crypto, gambling, and prediction-market sites were allowed.
    - Adult content appears selectively blocked, not categorically blocked.
    - Copyright/piracy-adjacent sites are often blocked but not categorically blocked.
    - Security dual-use, proxy/VPN/Tor, firearms, and pharmacy-ish categories were not broadly blocked in the tested sample.
    
    Documentation status:
    - Official docs I found document user-visible Browser/Chrome website approval and local allowed/blocked website settings.
    - I did not find official docs for the server-side global site classifier, aura/site_status, the exact "Browser Use is not permitted on ..." policy, a published global blacklist/allowlist, or an appeal/reclassification process.
    
    Why this seems actionable:
    - The block is not obviously tied to the user's local allow/block settings.
    - The block is not documented in the same place as user-visible site permissions.
    - The classifier is selective in ways that are hard to infer from safety category alone.
    - Legitimate commercial/research sites such as 1688/Taobao/AliExpress are blocked while many similar or more sensitive categories are allowed.
    
  4. joshp123 commented on Jun 21, 2026

    @joshp123
    Author
    AI-generated note on the bot-linked potential duplicates (#28764, #28478)

    AI-generated.

    GitHub's duplicate bot linked #28764 and #28478. I checked both. They are adjacent Browser Use security-policy reports, but they do not look like clean duplicates of this issue.

    • Codex App Browser Use keeps explicit-deny block for allowed calendar.google.com #28764 reports a Windows/Edge extension case where Codex can see and claim a manually opened Google Calendar tab, but page-content access is rejected as if the user explicitly denied https://calendar.google.com, despite visible Codex allow settings and Always allow browsing approval.

      That is a local allow-state / explicit-deny mismatch for a specific Google Calendar origin. This issue is different: the Chrome/Browser runtime works across many sites, but selected public destinations are denied by the Browser Use policy layer. The behavior looks like server-side destination classification, not a stale local user-deny setting for one allowed origin.

    • Using the Codex browser extension is blocked by the security policy #28478 is a sparse Chinese-language report saying the browser extension connection is normal, but page access is blocked by security policy. The screenshot clarifies the blocked site as my.feishu.cn and says it is blocked by a higher-level enterprise/network policy even when https://* is allowed.

      That may be in the same general policy area, but it is not the same report. It is a single enterprise SaaS/workspace domain with enterprise/network-policy wording and little reproduction detail. This issue maps a broader selective blocklist/allowlist pattern across public ecommerce, sourcing, China web, file-storage, payment, and sensitive comparator sites.

    Why this issue is distinct:

    • The plugin/runtime is present and usable.
    • The policy path appears reachable rather than failing globally.
    • Many external sites are allowed in the same session.
    • Specific destinations are denied with Browser Use policy errors.
    • The evidence is a destination-classification matrix, not just one blocked origin.

    So #28764 and #28478 are useful related examples of Browser Use policy friction, but they should not close this issue as duplicates unless the intended maintainer conclusion is that all of these symptoms share one underlying undocumented policy classifier. If so, this issue still adds the blocked/unblocked comparator matrix needed to debug that classifier.

  5. changed the title [-]Chrome plugin and browser refuse to interact with certain sites.[/-] [+]Chrome plugin, browser and computer use refuse to interact with certain sites.[/+] on Jun 21, 2026
  6. mikezio commented on Jun 22, 2026

    @mikezio

    I checked the robots.txt files for a bunch of the blocked examples you posted + there is def a pretty clear pattern here

    1688.com disallows generic crawlers from /offer/, /product/, /seller/, /member/, /catalog/ and a bunch of detail/query paths

    item.taobao.com allows Googlebot and Googlebot-Image but has User-agent: * Disallow: /

    login.taobao.com is also User-agent: * Disallow: /

    AliExpress disallows generic crawlers from /items/, /search/, /productdetail/, /product/, /shopcart/, /wishlist/, /api/* + related AJAX/detail/store surfaces

    Pinduoduo is just straight Disallow: /

    Mega has User-agent: * Disallow: / with a specific allowlist only for public/static/help/marketing pages

    Baidu Pan disallows share-link/share-home/list paths like /share/link/, /share/home/, /s/1*, /share/list

    WeChat Pay disallows most /index.php/ paths except a small public/docs/static allowlist

    So this does not look random to me, server side site status check Codex calls before browser interaction seems to be flagging sites/surfaces where the site itself is publishing restrictive crawler/automation rules especially product detail, search, login, cart/payment, file share + API surfaces

    The main thing I still agree with in this issue is the opacity. Browser Use is not permitted on makes it look arbitrary. Even a extremely rough reason category like “site automation policy” / “scraping sensitive surface” / “marketplace/product detail surface” would make this much easier to understand

  7. joshp123 commented on Jun 24, 2026

    @joshp123
    Author

    This also breaks appshots, btw. If you try and take an appshot on a Chrome window with a URL that's also blocked, you get an "unable to take appshot" message. Move the same Chrome window to a tab with a different non-blocked URL open, and appshots work just fine. This silent blocking really is not great UX :(

    Feedback ID: no-active-thread-019ef9fa-4ca5-7ed2-a621-b50d2b6519ce

  8. waffensam commented on Jun 26, 2026

    @waffensam

    Adding one concrete use case from #30167 before closing it as a duplicate of this broader issue.

    In my case, the blocked Taobao surfaces were encountered during an anti-cheat / abuse-reporting workflow, not normal shopping automation:

    • Goal: identify and report Taobao listings selling game cheats for Marathon / 失落星船.
    • Blocked surfaces observed: https://s.taobao.com/search and https://item.taobao.com/item.htm.
    • Intended allowed operations: read-only search result review, item-page inspection, evidence screenshots, and drafting report text.
    • Operations that should still remain gated or blocked: purchases, seller chat, account changes, payments, uploads, and final report submission without explicit user confirmation.

    This seems useful as a safety-governance edge case for the same site-policy issue: the current block prevents defensive reporting work, even when the requested agent behavior is limited to read-only review and user-confirmed report drafting.

  9. lom200 commented on Jul 4, 2026

    @lom200

    Adding another data point from Windows Codex Desktop.

    Environment:

    • Codex Desktop: 26.623.13972.0
    • bundled Chrome plugin/native host: 26.623.101652
    • Chrome extension: 1.1.5
    • Chrome: 149.0.7827.201

    Observed blocked origins:

    https://dzen.ru/sekurtis
    https://vk.ru/
    

    Both fail with the same class of error:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
    Reason: Browser use is not permitted on ...
    

    Control sites that worked in the same session/profile:

    • https://www.google.com/ - claim/read/evaluate/screenshot/search interaction worked
    • https://www.facebook.com/ - navigation/read/evaluate/screenshot worked
    • http://e1.ru/ -> https://www.e1.ru/ - navigation/read/evaluate/screenshot worked
    • https://www.gismeteo.ru/ - navigation/read/evaluate/screenshot worked; clicking an internal Новости link also worked

    Also checked that this is not a blanket .ru block: e1.ru and gismeteo.ru worked normally. Adding https://dzen.ru to local Browser Use origin allowlists did not change the rejection.

    This looks like a domain/category-level Browser Use policy decision rather than a broken Chrome extension or general network/browser failure. The main user-facing issue is that the rejection does not expose whether the block is intentional policy, a remote site-status result, or a local config/state problem, so users can spend time trying to repair Chrome/config when there may be nothing local to fix.

  10. chenlei-github commented on Jul 15, 2026

    @chenlei-github

    Adding a current macOS data point for WeChat public pages.

    Environment:

    • macOS 15.7.7 (24G720), x86_64
    • ChatGPT/Codex App 26.707.72221
    • Browser and Chrome plugins 26.707.72221

    Blocked:

    Allowed controls in the same Browser session:

    Troubleshooting already completed:

    • mp.weixin.qq.com is present in ~/.codex/browser/config.toml under allowed origins; denied origins are empty.
    • Changed approval_mode from never_ask to ask, reset the Browser runtime, and retested: no change.
    • Removed and reinstalled the bundled Browser plugin with the official CLI: no change.
    • Fully quit and relaunched the ChatGPT/Codex App, initialized a fresh Browser session, and retested: no change.

    Exact error:
    Browser use is not permitted for this request. See the Browser Use policy documentation.

    This confirms the issue is still reproducible in build 26.707.72221 and appears specific to the WeChat domain policy classification rather than local origin permissions, plugin installation, Browser session state, or general network access.

  11. zhangjinning1994-prog commented on Jul 27, 2026

    @zhangjinning1994-prog

    Adding a current Windows reproduction and a legitimate read-only procurement workflow.

    Environment:

    • Windows Codex app: 26.721.4979.0
    • bundled Chrome plugin: 26.721.41059
    • Codex Chrome extension: 1.2.27221.15725_0
    • personal account / existing signed-in Chrome profile

    Blocked in a fresh Browser runtime:

    • https://www.1688.com/
    • https://work.1688.com/home/buyer.htm?.../buyList
    • https://air.1688.com/app/ctf-page/trade-order-list/buyer-order-list.html
    • https://air.1688.com/app/ctf-page/trade-order-detail/index.html?...

    The public 1688 home page and authenticated buyer pages all return:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
    Reason: Browser use is not permitted on https://www.1688.com.
    

    Controls and troubleshooting:

    • Chrome extension/native host diagnostics pass and the extension backend connects.
    • The same Chrome profile can control other authenticated sites.
    • Global origin config explicitly allows https://1688.com, https://work.1688.com, and https://air.1688.com; denied list is empty.
    • The active thread/session allowlist also includes the 1688 buyer origins.
    • Thread metadata reports sandbox: none; this is not networkAccess: false.
    • Full rebuild/reinstall/restart of bundled Browser/Chrome plugin, extension host manifest, and native-host registry did not change the result.
    • A new Browser runtime after reinstall still blocks the 1688 public homepage.
    • The bundle's 24-hour in-memory site-status cache was therefore not the cause.

    Business use case:

    • Read-only lookup of the user's own historical purchase orders and latest purchase price on 1688.
    • The result is used to fill missing fixed costs in the user's ERP.
    • No purchasing, payment, messaging, account changes, or other write action is requested.
    • The user explicitly authorized access to these pages and placed the domains in the documented allowlist.

    This confirms that the issue persists in the newer 26.721 build and is not resolved by the documented local site controls. Please reclassify 1688 for user-authorized read-only workflows, or provide an official appeal/override path for personal accounts.

  12. 28 remaining items

  13. yangchengwu2024 commented on Sep 30, 2026

    @yangchengwu2024

    Windows Browser Use: request review of WeChat site_status_blocked classification

    The user explicitly authorized downloading a shared WeChat video. Two normal Browser Use operations were rejected by the site-status policy before user permission or Auto-review was reached. Please review the classification and provide the applicable reason and a supported resolution.

    Observed environment

    • Windows; Codex Desktop 26.928.2636.0, observed during investigation on 2026-09-30.
    • Bundled Chrome browser tool 26.928.21956.
    • Chrome browsing and download permissions visibly set to Always allow.
    • Local browser approval settings are never_ask.
    • Normal Chrome tab inventory succeeds.

    Actual observations

    • 2026-09-30 08:19:59 UTC: listing media assets on a public article at https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ZFNcR1BSQy9-s2lDtd97fw was rejected.
    • 2026-09-30 08:46:39 UTC: inspecting the normally resolved shared-video page at https://channels.weixin.qq.com/finder-preview/pages/feed was rejected. Signed query parameters are intentionally omitted; the sanitized path alone was not separately tested.

    Both returned:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
    Reason: The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted.
    

    Relevant implementation observations

    Static inspection of the installed bundle identifies this message as site_status_blocked, decision source site_status, audit source openai_site_policy. This is separate from persisted user denial, enterprise policy denial, user refusal, and Auto-review denial.

    The browser service queries https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/aura/site_status. This bundle interprets feature_status.agent === true as blocked, then rejects before the normal origin-consent path. The raw service response was not captured, so we cannot establish the underlying classification reason or whether these specific denials used cached results.

    The site-status result is cached by hostname for 24 hours, although the request includes path and query. In the cache-hit branch, a background fetch is launched without writing its successful result back into the cache. Please review the intended cache scope and refresh behavior. This static observation does not prove that stale cache caused these incidents.

    Requested source-level resolution

    1. Explain the site-status classification and its scope for the two observed destinations, and review it for the user-authorized workflow.
    2. If the classification is incorrect, correct it through the supported policy-review process.
    3. Review whether hostname caching and the cache-hit refresh behavior can preserve or broaden a denial beyond its intended scope.
    4. Show the distinction between user website permissions and platform site-safety decisions, including an actionable reason and supported review route.

    No bypass was attempted during this diagnosis. The browser policy code and local permissions were not modified. This report contains no cookies, credentials, signed playback tokens, account screenshots, browsing history, or unrelated session content. It does not claim that every WeChat page is blocked or that the classification is necessarily a false positive.

  14. songshujun-001 commented on Oct 2, 2026

    @songshujun-001

    Additional macOS / native Chromium reproduction for WeChat Channels (2026-10-02)

    Environment

    • macOS ARM64
    • ChatGPT/Codex desktop 26.928.40906 (build 12694)
    • Native Chromium, accessed through the supported cua_repl Computer Use tool
    • Target origin: https://channels.weixin.qq.com

    Observed comparison

    1. Selecting Chromium returned a valid accessibility tree for an existing Chrome Web Store tab.
    2. Switching to the existing WeChat Channels tab and requesting accessibility state caused the tool to stop the session.
    3. Latest refusal: 2026-10-02T06:55:46.434Z UTC.

    Exact error
    This session has been stopped because Computer Use is not allowed on the current browser URL.
    The response additionally instructed the agent to stop and stated that navigating to the URL manually would not permit Computer Use. No rule ID, detected URL, or policy source was supplied. The agent stopped.

    Permission evidence

    • Chromium appears in the desktop UI under Always allowed apps.
    • The current browser configuration contains approval_mode=never_ask, full_cdp_access_enabled=true, and empty origins.allowed and origins.denied arrays. Empty arrays are not assumed to grant or deny site access.
    • The configuration was modified at 2026-10-02T06:44:34Z; this latest failure occurred after that change.
    • Earlier checks did not find an explicit local managed deny in the common documented locations. This does not rule out effective runtime policy.

    Scope

    • The reproduction uses native Computer Use; it does not invoke the project's Playwright publisher.
    • No uploads, publication, or permission modifications were performed during this reproduction and read-only investigation.
    • Desktop logs and readable packaged JavaScript did not identify the matched rule.

    Additional local findings (read-only investigation on 2026-10-02)

    • The same refusal wording was found in the native SkyComputerUseService executable. The original tool output did not expose its numeric code or matched policy; the binary string alone does not establish the actual branch taken.
    • The bundled and user-directory service copies are both 26.924.1001281, build 1001281, and their executable SHA256 values are identical. A stale service copy was not found.
    • The native service contains ComputerUseURLPolicyChecking, AuraSiteStatusURLPolicyChecker, SiteStatusResponse and urlPolicyBlocked identifiers. No private service endpoints were invoked.
    • The readable @oai/sky 0.7.5 client defines blockedURL=-10015, forwards only native JSON-RPC error code/message and uses CodexComputerUseIPC-5. The original tool output did not expose its numeric code, so this report does not assert that the observed call returned -10015.
    • Client/server protocol mismatch has a separate error path. Native app inspection of the ordinary tab succeeded in the same session before the URL refusal.
    • Narrow macOS unified-log checks did not expose the matching rule. The computer-use config.json contains UI localization fields only.
    • No Tencent response, CAPTCHA, account error or upload failure was observed as the cause of this tool error.

    Requested investigation
    Please identify the effective URL decision, matching rule/policy source, and the detected origin for this failure. Is this an intentional restriction, a permission-scope mismatch, or a client/runtime defect? If erroneous, please provide the supported remediation and a way to verify it.

    Privacy
    This report omits credentials, cookies, account names, local profile paths, and full conversation/log files. Minimal request-correlation details can be supplied privately through an official support channel if the account owner authorizes it.

  15. Ryx82 commented on Oct 3, 2026

    @Ryx82

    标题:Browser Use 对 pan.baidu.com 直接拒绝访问,未提供可见的授权入口

    应用内反馈 ID:01a0fcc4-a767-7330-917f-a03d44a88d62
    记录日期:2026-10-03(北京时间)
    环境:Windows 桌面应用,内置浏览器,Browser Use 已开启。

    问题描述
    用户希望让 Codex 读取并整理本人的百度网盘目录。内置浏览器能够由用户打开 https://pan.baidu.com/disk/main,但代理尝试绑定该页面时立即被站点安全策略拒绝。

    实际错误
    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
    The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted.
    Browser use is not permitted on https://pan.baidu.com/disk/main.

    复现步骤

    1. 在内置浏览器中由用户打开百度网盘。
    2. 请求代理读取网盘目录以准备整理方案。
    3. 代理调用正常 Browser Use 页面访问方法。
    4. 工具直接拒绝,未弹出网站访问授权请求。

    已核查的情况

    1. 用户提供的浏览器设置截图显示 Browser Use 已开启。
    2. 用户在当前浏览器设置中未找到允许或阻止网站的管理入口。
    3. 可读取的用户配置中未发现针对百度网盘的 browser_use 禁止规则;系统 requirements.toml 和本机 managed_config.toml 在检查位置未找到。
    4. 2026-10-02 和 2026-10-03 的相关应用日志中可以找到百度网盘的导航记录,但本次检索未找到解释站点安全拒绝来源的记录。该结果不能证明不存在其他管理策略。
    5. 应用内反馈已成功提交,并返回上述反馈 ID。

    请求核查
    请确认这次拒绝来自用户网站权限、组织管理策略、产品站点安全策略还是其他原因。
    若允许由用户授权,请提供当前 Windows 桌面版本的正式入口。
    若属于不可由用户覆盖的限制,请明确说明负责处理的管理方或支持渠道。

    范围
    本文未包含百度网盘文件名、文件内容、登录凭据或完整应用日志。
    尚未取得百度网盘目录清单,尚未移动、重命名或删除网盘文件。

  16. icebabbyy commented on Oct 6, 2026

    @icebabbyy

    Windows reproduction and request for a scoped, user-confirmed read-only exception

    Adding another affected user case to this existing issue, rather than opening a duplicate.

    Environment verified on 6 October 2026:

    • Codex Desktop Windows package: 26.930.4958.0.
    • Windows 11 Home Single Language, x64, build 10.0.26200.
    • Chrome extension browser connection remains available; unrelated GitHub and inventory-management tabs are accessible.

    Recorded Browser Use denials on 6 October 2026:

    • https://login.taobao.com/havanaone/login/login.htm, 10:12:46 UTC.
    • https://www.taobao.com, 10:15:38 UTC.

    The tool returned:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
    The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted.

    The error explicitly prohibits alternate browser surfaces, raw CDP and indirect workarounds. We have respected that restriction; these are recorded failures, not a claim of a newly successful live test.

    The user reports completing Taobao login manually and explicitly authorizes product research. The intended browser work is narrowly limited to reading product titles, complete SKU/variant labels and prices, images and shipment/specification text from shop/product pages, for preparing inventory drafts in a separate system. The login state has not been independently revalidated through the blocked browser tool.

    Could OpenAI provide a supported scoped read-only exception after explicit human confirmation, limited by approved origin and session, with consequential operations separately gated? The request does not include checkout, purchasing, payments, cart changes, messaging, account changes, uploads, or cookie/token export.

    If such access cannot be allowed, please provide:

    1. A documented classification/reason and supported appeal path for the denial.
    2. UI that clearly distinguishes product-level site-safety restrictions from user/workspace settings and ordinary website anti-bot challenges.
    3. A supported product-data ingestion route for this legitimate read-only workflow.

    We are not asking for a blanket safety-policy bypass or an undocumented client patch. Manual sign-in and existing browser connectivity are available; what is missing is a supported way for the tool to proceed with the authorized read-only task.

  17. Grif001 commented on Oct 7, 2026

    @Grif001

    Windows: VK read-only access blocked on October 7, 2026

    Please review the site-safety classification for https://vk.ru/rusgeocomru. The requested workflow is reading public community publications for content monitoring.

    Observed error:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
    Reason: The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted.
    Browser use is not permitted on https://vk.ru/rusgeocomru.
    

    Environment recorded during troubleshooting: Windows, Codex Desktop 26.1002.6548.0, CLI 0.162.0-alpha.2. The denial was observed through the built-in browser and Chrome integration. Updating and restarting did not restore access. An unrelated public news site (chipdip.ru/news) could be read through the built-in browser.

    Timeline qualification: the October 6 collection record shows a feed-rendering failure without an explicit site-policy denial; the October 7 record shows an explicit security-policy rejection. This does not establish successful access on October 6, an exact policy-change time, or that an app update caused the denial.

    Could the team confirm whether this is an intended restriction or a classification defect, explain the applicable reason and scope, and provide a supported review/restoration process? If fixed, please identify the relevant version or server-side change.

    Posted with the user's authorization. No cookies, credentials, private content, or raw diagnostic logs are included.

  18. ygf678-rgb commented on Oct 8, 2026

    @ygf678-rgb

    Adding a macOS / Chrome reproduction affecting the NetEase creator platform, observed on 8 October 2026.

    Target origin: https://mp.163.com.

    Related NetEase report #40354 concerns a different origin (campus.163.com); this adds the creator-platform case.

    The account owner requested preparation of a non-health lifestyle article in their own creator account. The intended workflow is to enter the title and article, upload its illustrations and cover, and leave the final publication action to the owner.

    Binding the already-open target tab through the supported Browser Use interface was rejected before page contents were read:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
    Reason: The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted.
    Browser use is not permitted on https://mp.163.com.
    

    Read-only diagnostics performed:

    • Chrome is running; the extension is installed and enabled in the active profile.
    • Extension version: 1.26.901.11451_0.
    • The official native-host manifest diagnostic reports a valid name and matching extension origins, with no problem.
    • The owner's browser-permissions screenshot shows only the Default row, with Browsing set to Always allow and no site-specific exceptions.
    • Another creator platform's image upload and draft save succeeded through the same Chrome extension that day.
    • Checked local user/system configuration locations and macOS managed-preference locations did not contain a matching origin denial. This does not establish the absence of cloud-managed requirements.

    The rejected action was not retried through another browser surface or an indirect publishing route. No safety checks were disabled. Codex has not entered or published the article; any later manual submission by the owner has not been independently verified.

    Please clarify the effective policy source and reason for this origin's denial, whether the classification is intentional or erroneous, and the supported review or restoration process. If a fix exists, please identify the relevant product version or server-side change.

    This report contains no account identity, article text, local username or paths, cookies, tokens, screenshots, private logs, or chat identifiers.

    Posted with the account owner's explicit authorization.

  19. kaneyu8-cloud commented on Oct 8, 2026

    @kaneyu8-cloud

    Additional evidence from Codex desktop on Windows, observed during a user-authorized workflow involving public supplier product images and specifications:

    The user can manually open this public product page in the in-app browser:
    https://detail.1688.com/offer/675082473201.html

    The browser tool previously returned:
    "Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy."
    "The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted."
    "Browser use is not permitted on https://detail.1688.com/offer/675082473201.html."

    This prevents an otherwise authorized product-material collection workflow. Installing a local Chrome material-collection extension does not provide the agent with a supported way to resolve this denial. The currently exposed browser capabilities do not include a site-safety review or permission-management action.

    There is also a separate limitation when attempting to open an extension popup: the browser URL policy permits HTTP/HTTPS but rejects chrome-extension:// URLs. This should be distinguished from the 1688 site-safety refusal.

    Could maintainers provide a supported review process for a potentially misclassified public supplier site, and clarify whether any user-facing permission setting applies to this specific site-safety denial? No policy bypass has been attempted.

    No account credentials, browser cookies, private session logs, screenshots, or local filesystem paths are included in this report.

  20. ChuJiQiQi commented on Oct 10, 2026

    @ChuJiQiQi

    Linux / Chrome: Civitai blocked despite Full access — 2026-10-10

    Adding a concrete reproduction to this existing issue.

    Environment and requested task

    • Linux desktop, the user's existing Chrome profile, official bundled Browser and Unified Computer Use integration.
    • Installed Browser bundle: 26.930.51102 (desktop app version was not collected).
    • The permissions UI shows Full access. Local configuration confirms sandbox_mode = "danger-full-access" and approval_policy = "never".
    • The user explicitly requested signing into their own Civitai account via Discord and reading their Buzz balance. No purchase, Buzz spending, content generation, or account changes were requested.

    Observed failure
    Opening the public homepage https://civitai.com through the supported browser tool was rejected before any Civitai page state was returned:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy. Reason: The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted. Browser use is not permitted on https://civitai.com.
    

    The diagnostic also explicitly prohibits alternate browser surfaces, indirect execution, and other workarounds. The agent stopped the Civitai task; no alternate route was attempted. Other sites, including Discord and GitHub, remained accessible through the same Chrome connection. Civitai login and the balance lookup were never completed.

    Read-only inspection of the installed browser bundle maps this error to site_status_blocked, with decisionSource: "site_status", separately from persisted user denial and approval decisions. The service constructs requests to https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/aura/site_status. This identifies the enforcement layer, but does not reveal why Civitai was classified this way or establish that the classification is erroneous.

    Requested resolution

    1. Confirm whether the Civitai homepage restriction is intentional or a classification defect, and explain its reason and scope.
    2. Provide a supported review/appeal process or a scoped, explicitly user-authorized route for this read-only account task.
    3. Make the UI and error distinguish Full access / user website permissions from platform site restrictions. The current “unrestricted access to the internet” wording leaves the user expecting approval settings to resolve a denial that never reaches approval.

    The user explicitly authorized posting this feedback. No credentials, cookies, account balances, private account identifiers, or raw session logs are included.

  21. daige5680-png commented on Oct 10, 2026

    @daige5680-png

    Additional reproduction: VK Browser Use denied after a user-side origin allow setting

    Observed on 2026-10-07 in the Windows desktop application, Codex mode, personal Pro. Running package verified earlier that day: OpenAI.Codex 26.930.7945.0. The attempted route was the built-in browser.

    The account owner set browsing for https://vk.com and https://vk.ru to Always allow. A single access attempt after that setting still failed at https://vk.com/search before a user approval or Auto-review prompt. The same browser could open the OpenAI Help Center.

    The returned diagnostic stated that the site-safety policy blocked the action, Browser Use was not permitted on that URL, and the agent must not achieve the same result through alternate browser surfaces, raw CDP, indirect execution or policy circumvention. No such workaround was performed.

    Please clarify whether this is an intended product restriction or a false positive. If it is a false positive, what supported recovery or review process applies to a personal account? If it is intended, please clarify the applicable scope and document the user-facing behavior. No account credentials, private session data, raw logs or customer information are included here.

    Follow-up observations on 2026-10-08: the owner restarted the desktop app. A read-only check found the registered Windows package and the currently running application both at package version 26.930.7945.0. The built-in update check still returned installedVersion 26.930.61225, installedBuildVersion 13232, release channel prod, and status restart_required. These are different version fields; we have not assumed their difference proves a fault. No new VK search attempt was made and no bypass was performed. Please clarify the supported next step without requiring repeated permission changes or repeated restarts with no relevant change.

  22. wangpengsheng326 commented on Oct 10, 2026

    @wangpengsheng326

    macOS / native Chrome: URL refusal persists after a site-specific allowance (2026-10-10)

    Adding a bounded reproduction with the account owner's explicit authorization.

    Installed environment (read from local version metadata; loaded process versions were not independently verified):

    • macOS 27.0.1
    • ChatGPT/Codex desktop 26.1007.21159, build 20052
    • Google Chrome 154.0.8037.99
    • WeChat for Mac 4.1.13

    Task and observations
    The requested workflow is read-only: navigate an existing business task, open its linked enterprise contact card in WeChat, and read the company field. No contact addition, messages, requests, or business-data changes are authorized. Earlier official native browser navigation and a separate WeChat screenshot both succeeded.

    The user identified the browser handoff page as https://work.weixin.qq.com/ca/<redacted> and reported saving Always allow for the exact origin https://work.weixin.qq.com under Settings → Browser → Agent permissions. That setting is user-confirmed, not independently inspected by the tool.

    One subsequent check through the official native interface:

    await cua.getApp('com.google.Chrome');

    returned after 5.1736 seconds:

    This session has been stopped because Computer Use is not allowed on the current browser URL. Stop your work and send a final message noting why the session has been ended. Note that Computer Use is not allowed on this URL even if the user navigates to it themselves.
    

    The agent stopped. No alternate browser surface, direct protocol call, or policy bypass was attempted. The diagnostic did not return the actual rejected URL. Consequently, the user-provided handoff origin cannot yet be conclusively identified as the rejected URL, and the policy source remains unknown. A narrow local log check found no correlated denial event; this does not establish the absence of a policy restriction.

    Requested clarification

    1. How can we obtain the actual rejected URL/origin and the enforcing policy source using a supported diagnostic?
    2. Should a saved website allowance apply to this native Chrome access path?
    3. If this is an intentional platform restriction, what is its scope? If it is a classification or integration defect, what supported review/recovery is available?
    4. Please distinguish these cases in the error/UI so users are not repeatedly changing permissions without effect.

    This comment omits contact identifiers, business account/task identifiers, company names, screenshots, raw logs, chat IDs, local user paths, cookies and credentials. Existing logins and task state have been left untouched.

  23. SkyForThinking commented on Oct 14, 2026

    @SkyForThinking

    Additional reproduction: Brazilian AliExpress product page in Chrome (2026-10-14)

    I am adding a concrete pt.aliexpress.com case to this existing issue with the account owner's authorization. The task was read-only product-price research for a Brazilian livestream selection sheet. The user could open the product normally in Chrome.

    Environment: macOS; ChatGPT/Codex desktop Browser Use build 26.924.22138; unified-computer-use@openai-bundled; connected Chrome extension.

    Reproduction: cua.getState() listed the user's existing Chrome tab for https://pt.aliexpress.com/item/1005010182516019.html?gatewayAdapt=usa2bra (8BitDo Pro 3 product). The agent then called cua.getTab('119913139', {browser:'1'}). It was rejected before page access:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy. Reason: The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted. Browser use is not permitted on https://pt.aliexpress.com/item/1005010182516019.html.

    The same Chrome connection had successfully bound and interacted with a GitHub tab. No alternate browser surface, raw CDP, or other workaround was used for the rejected AliExpress access.

    Read-only local diagnosis: the bundled Browser Use component queries chatgpt.com/backend-api/aura/site_status with site_url and maps feature_status.agent === true to site_status_blocked. Its local cache key is the hostname, with a 24-hour TTL. The tool response does not reveal whether this specific product URL received a fresh backend decision or reused a cached pt.aliexpress.com decision. This is a possible false positive or overly broad host-level result; we cannot determine the backend reason locally.

    Request: Please review the site-status decision and cache behavior for the Brazilian AliExpress origin, clarify whether the block is intentional, and provide a supported route for correction if the classification is wrong. This prevents a legitimate browser workflow even when the user opens the page themselves. I also sent the reproduction to the official Help Center support chat; it did not provide an engineering ticket number.

    No credentials, account email, private chat ID, raw logs, or customer data are included.

  24. edwardchin811227 commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @edwardchin811227

    Additional reproduction: 1688 blocked despite Always Allow on Windows (2026-10-15)

    I am adding a current 1688 reproduction with the account owner's explicit authorization.

    Environment: Windows 10 Home China 22H2 (build 19045); ChatGPT/Codex desktop app; built-in @Browser.

    Permission state: The user added https://1688.com under Browser → Agent permissions and set both browsing and downloads to Always allow.

    Reproduction: The agent attempted a read-only navigation using the supported built-in browser interface:

    await cua.createBrowserTab("iab", "https://1688.com", { visible: true });

    The action was rejected before page access, after the destination was normalized to https://www.1688.com:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy. Reason: The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted. Browser use could not acquire authority to observe page content. The site safety gate did not grant access for https://www.1688.com.

    The agent stopped immediately. No alternate browser surface, raw CDP, indirect execution, or policy workaround was attempted.

    Feedback session ID: 01a13e58-54b6-7cf3-9611-869340c4f36f

    Request: Please review whether 1688.com and its operational subdomains (including www.1688.com, detail.1688.com, and work.1688.com) are being incorrectly classified. Please also provide a supported correction or appeal route when a legitimate site is blocked by the site-safety gate. The user-level Always Allow setting currently cannot override this result.

    No credentials, cookies, account email, customer data, or private business records are included.

  25. crisdosaygo commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @crisdosaygo

    I'd make this a diagnostic result the user can act on. "Always allow" and a platform-level site refusal are different decisions, but the current UI makes people keep editing the first one to fix the second.

    A refusal should expose the effective origin after redirects, the decision source (user, workspace or product policy), a reason category, and a reference for the supported review path. If the result was cached, include its age and explain how a corrected decision reaches the client.

    The new 1688.com → www.1688.com report is a good regression case: show which origin was actually evaluated, and whether the saved permission applies. The agent can then stop cleanly and give the user the right next step. No need to expose private classifier details or make the user reverse-engineer the bundle to find the responsible layer.

  26. alympra commented on Oct 18, 2026

    @alympra

    Additional macOS reproduction: Taobao search rejected after reported manual sign-in (2026-10-18)

    Adding the observed reproduction to this existing issue rather than opening a duplicate.

    Environment

    • macOS 27.0, build 26A428; Apple Silicon. uname -mprs: Darwin 27.0.0 arm64 arm.
    • Installed ChatGPT/Codex desktop app: 26.1007.71326, build 20398, bundle identifier com.openai.codex.
    • Installed Microsoft Edge: 155.0.4283.62.
    • App and Edge versions were read from installed bundle metadata, not the About dialogs; loaded process versions were not independently verified.
    • Surfaces observed: native Microsoft Edge through Computer Use, and the desktop in-app browser (IAB).

    Observed behavior

    1. Native Edge returned a readable accessibility tree on a New Tab/search page. After an attempt to navigate to the Taobao homepage, the next accessibility-state request stopped the Computer Use session with:

      This session has been stopped because Computer Use is not allowed on the current browser URL. Stop your work and send a final message noting why the session has been ended. Note that Computer Use is not allowed on this URL even if the user navigates to it themselves.
      

      This diagnostic did not return the detected URL, so the exact native URL that triggered that refusal remains unconfirmed.

    2. Separate, user-requested control checks in the IAB succeeded:

      • Amazon.com homepage, a generic product search, and a product detail page were readable.
      • The Tmall homepage and recommended product titles/prices were readable.
    3. A product search started from Tmall led to an existing https://s.taobao.com/search tab with tab=mall. The account owner then reported completing manual sign-in and explicitly asked for another read-only check. The signed-in state could not be independently verified because page access was subsequently refused.

    4. IAB tab inventory succeeded and returned the title 保温杯_淘宝搜索 and the s.taobao.com/search URL. Binding that existing tab by its inventory ID with the supported cua.getTab(tabId, { browser: "iab" }) operation failed before page content was returned:

      Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy. Reason: The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted. Browser use could not acquire authority to observe page content. The site safety gate did not grant access for https://s.taobao.com. Site safety policy blocked this URL. The agent must not attempt to achieve the same outcome via workaround, indirect execution, raw CDP or browser commands, alternate browser surfaces, or policy circumvention. Proceed only with a materially safer alternative that does not require this blocked browser action; if none exists, stop and request user input.
      

    Evidence limits and requested clarification

    The observed IAB failure explicitly identifies the site-safety gate. It does not reveal the matched rule or explain why this destination was classified this way. Local website-permission settings and managed policies were not inspected, and this report does not claim to rule them out. We also do not claim that the native Edge refusal and IAB refusal have an identical internal error code.

    Please clarify whether read-only access to s.taobao.com is intentionally restricted or eligible for classification review, and provide a supported diagnostic/review route. The UI should distinguish this refusal from website login, user-denied permissions, browser connectivity, and Auto-review decisions.

    Related reports: #44943, #53349, #54950.

    The agent stopped after each explicit policy refusal. No policy bypass was attempted. This comment omits account identities, cookies, credentials, full search URLs/query identifiers, chat IDs, screenshots, and raw logs. Posted with the account owner's explicit authorization.

  27. FrankD-F commented on Oct 19, 2026

    @FrankD-F

    Additional macOS reproduction: jinbao.pinduoduo.com blocked before page access

    This adds a macOS reproduction for the distinct Pinduoduo affiliate origin to #29343. Related report #52484 concerns the different merchant origin yingxiao.pinduoduo.com; this report does not assume both origins have the same classification.

    Summary

    Browser Use refuses access to the Pinduoduo affiliate-link conversion page in the user's installed Google Chrome. The user has expressly authorized the task and reports that the page is already open in their signed-in Chrome profile. The agent never obtained authority to observe page content and did not submit any conversion.

    Please clarify whether this is an intended site restriction or a false positive, and provide the supported review/recovery route. This report does not request a security-control bypass.

    Environment

    • macOS 26.3.1, Apple silicon (arm64).
    • Running desktop app: ChatGPT 26.1013.40934 (build 20770), using Codex and the bundled Computer Use tool.
    • Codex compatibility app 26.915.31945 (build 9922) is also installed. Both app bundles have identifier com.openai.codex. This is an observed secondary diagnostic fact, not a proven cause.
    • Target: https://jinbao.pinduoduo.com/promotion/url-promotion
    • Browser: installed external Google Chrome.

    Existing reproduction evidence

    The previously attempted documented binding was:

    await cua.getTab(
      { url: "https://jinbao.pinduoduo.com/promotion/url-promotion" },
      { browser: "chrome" }
    );

    It returned:

    Browser Use rejected this action due to browser security policy.
    The site-safety policy blocks this action; no user permission prompt or Auto-review was attempted.
    The site safety gate did not grant access for https://jinbao.pinduoduo.com.

    No further requests to the blocked site, alternate surfaces, raw browser protocols, session resets, or indirect browser-control workarounds were attempted during this investigation.

    Diagnostic findings

    • The installed tool's error mapping distinguishes site_status_blocked (site_status, non-retryable) from persisted_user_denied, guardian_denied, and site_status_unavailable (retryable).
    • No explicit Pinduoduo deny was found in the checked local browser_use configuration. UI-saved site permissions and all effective server-side policies were not inspected.
    • Local diagnostics reported successful configuration loading and desktop app-server initialization. They also reported a separate optional desktop-runtime CDN timeout; there is no evidence tying that warning to this site-status denial.
    • Opening the desktop app's settings via the documented native Computer Use API was separately denied for the com.openai.codex app, so the agent could not inspect the settings UI or open /feedback itself.
    • The detailed site classification, rule ID, and reason for this site's status were not included in the returned error.

    Requested resolution

    1. Confirm the intended policy for this origin and what caused the blocked status, to the extent it can be disclosed.
    2. If this is a false positive, route it to the responsible site-safety reviewer and explain the supported process for correction.
    3. If intentional, document the restriction and supported alternatives that do not bypass it.
    4. Clarify whether normal user site-allow permissions are relevant to this error, rather than a saved-user-deny error.

    No credentials, account IDs, conversation IDs, sheet links, affiliate tracking links, business data, or raw logs are included.

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