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False "Cyber Abuse" Policy Flag for Legitimate Reverse Engineering Work #30271

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Description

@EdwardBlair

What issue are you seeing?

I do a significant amount of reverse engineering and vulnerability analysis on my own hardware/devices/systems, I am verified through https://chatgpt.com/cyber

Today I received:

OpenAI's terms and policies restrict the use of our services in a number of areas. We have identified activity in Codex that is not permitted under our policies for:

  • Cyber Abuse

Of course, I appealed, but it seems others have this issue too.

Uploaded thread: 019f03ba-7d8f-7f40-8f87-06873871a4b4

Activity

  1. github-actions commented on Jun 26, 2026

    @github-actions
    Contributor
  2. Ed1sonL1-byte commented on Jun 26, 2026

    @Ed1sonL1-byte

    same, even though aleady verified by codex

  3. EdwardBlair commented on Jun 27, 2026

    @EdwardBlair
    Author

    Worthwhile to note, I got no indication of this in the terminal. I only received this as an email.

  4. EdwardBlair commented on Jun 28, 2026

    @EdwardBlair
    Author

    Of course it went through the normal appeals process.....

    Thank you for reaching out to OpenAI Support. After carefully reviewing your account, we are upholding our decision to issue a warning to your access. We will no longer consider additional requests to appeal this case.

  5. jyongchul commented on Jul 27, 2026

    @jyongchul

    I received the same authenticated, email-only “Cyber Abuse” warning on 2026-07-27. There was no in-product incident notice, and the email provided no event timestamp, session/thread/request ID, prompt, output, command, tool action, target, specific policy subsection, or corrective action.

    After reviewing my recent activity, I found no malware development, phishing, credential theft, unauthorized access, unsolicited security testing, malicious scanning, spam, deception, or safeguard circumvention. The relevant work was routine, authorized administration of systems I own or control: access hardening, credential rotation, remote administration, DNS/mail-security configuration, storage recovery, and controlled deployment planning.

    OpenAI’s Cyber Safety documentation acknowledges that legitimate or non-cyber activity can be flagged and says classifiers are still being calibrated:
    https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/cyber-safety

    I am using the private appeal channel for account-specific review and am intentionally not posting my email address, case reference, private thread data, or appeal token here.

    Product requests:

    • Include a stable private incident ID, timestamp, affected surface, and specific policy subsection in every warning.
    • Provide a private description of the triggering prompt, output, command, tool action, or usage signal.
    • Distinguish classifier rerouting from an account-standing warning or enforcement action.
    • Add a first-class “Report false positive” action to every Codex surface.
    • Provide a human-review path and state clearly whether the account remains in good standing.

    A warning that identifies only a broad category gives a legitimate user no actionable way to understand or correct the alleged problem.

  6. sergeykomlev commented on Jul 30, 2026

    @sergeykomlev

    Same thing happened to me. Built an export feature for my own internal SaaS – synthetic data, isolated environment, migration purpose. Request went through fine, got the code, finished the task. Next day at noon – warning for "Cyber Abuse" out of nowhere.

    Appealed with full context. They replied with a generic "we uphold the decision" and zero explanation of what triggered it or how to avoid it. No more appeals.

    Classic GPT-5.6 automated overreach. Delayed flagging, zero transparency, and they don't care about context. Happening to a lot of devs since this summer.

  7. DeadByDawn101 commented on Sep 9, 2026

    @DeadByDawn101

    On 9/9/2026 I received an automated "Cyber Abuse" enforcement email without any corresponding in-app notification. The alert provided no operational context: no event timestamp, session or request ID, triggering prompt, tool execution log, policy sub-clause, or remediation path.
    A thorough review of my recent activity shows only authorized, routine system administration on environments I own and manage. Furthermore, my Codex usage is strictly confined to my own personal, private GitHub repositories to develop and maintain my own code. Tasks conducted within these private repositories included access hardening, credential rotations, remote system administration, DNS and mail authentication configuration, data recovery, and controlled deployment staging. At no point did this involve malware generation, credential harvesting, unauthorized testing, port scanning, exploitation, or safeguard evasion.
    As acknowledged in OpenAI’s Cyber Safety documentation (https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/cyber-safety), classifiers are actively being calibrated and frequently misclassify routine administrative commands as malicious activity. I have already escalated this via the private appeal flow—omitting sensitive account IDs, tokens, and case numbers here—to resolve the false positive directly.
    Recommended Product Enhancements
    ⚬ Actionable Incident Metadata: Include a persistent incident ID, precise UTC timestamp, originating platform surface, and the exact policy subsection triggered.
    ⚬ Trigger Visibility: Surface a private snippet or description of the specific prompt, tool invocation, command, or heuristic flag responsible for the alert.
    ⚬ Triage vs. Enforcement Separation: Visually and procedurally distinguish routine classifier rerouting/refusals from formal strikes against account standing.
    ⚬ Native Feedback UI: Add an inline "Report False Positive" action across all Codex and developer surfaces.
    ⚬ Human Escalation & Status Clarity: Guarantee a human-reviewed resolution path and explicitly state whether the account remains in good standing.
    Broad, opaque alerts that cite only high-level policy categories give legitimate operators no technical basis to audit their workflows, remediate issues, or verify account safety.

  8. bsy0318 commented on Sep 9, 2026

    @bsy0318

    I'm experiencing the exact same "Cyber Abuse" false-positive ban, and every support channel (appeals, forums, emails) is completely blocked by automated bots.

    It happened while I was using Computer Use to debug my private app; the system seems to have misclassified my rapid 'cancel/resume' commands as an attack vector.

    If OpenAI is going to perma-ban users with broken bots, they must at least refund the remaining paid plan and provide a full data export as mandated by GDPR. Taking our money and holding our personal data hostage without human review is completely unacceptable.

    Has anyone found a working method to escalate this to a human on the Trust & Safety team?

    Case-ID: C-YeXh3cgVcYWX

  9. sergeykomlev commented on Sep 9, 2026

    @sergeykomlev

    OpenAI support replied that they would forward the my suggestion to the development team. However, there is no timeline for when the feature will be added.

    At minimum, there should be explanatory messages indicating what went wrong.

    Simply stating, in two words, that you performed a function or conducted an analysis and that something is considered “cyberfraud” is extremely unclear.

    These processes must be more transparent. If exporting user data from your own system is being treated as cyberabuse, that needs to be explained — otherwise, by that logic, an export of a database could be classified as cyberabuse as well, which is nonsensical.

    Filters can and do make mistakes, but they currently lack sufficient context about what the user is doing. For example, the system might assume I am operating from someone else’s server, when in fact it is my server.

    Some form of verification — for instance confirming ownership of a domain or an IP address — could demonstrate that the system belongs to the requester.

    I don’t know the exact implementation details, but this kind of verification is feasible and would improve context-awareness and reduce false positives.

    https://community.openai.com/t/improving-transparency-around-automated-cyber-abuse-enforcement/1388469/4?u=sergeykomlev

  10. EdwardBlair commented on Sep 14, 2026

    @EdwardBlair
    Author

    Tue 21 Jul, 16:39 C-dZ8FhvVFeSR7 Cyber Abuse
    Tue 21 Jul, 20:36 C-dZ8FhvVFeSR7 We have determined that we incorrectly issued a warning on your account. We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

    With daybreak blue, although it occasionally was on Sol/Astra by mistake, which did give refusals:

    Mon 14 Sept, 22:58 C-fySq0HIZqUoh Cyber Abuse
    Tues 15 Sept, 03:16 C-fySq0HIZqUoh We have determined that we incorrectly issued a warning on your account. We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

  11. EdwardBlair commented on Sep 15, 2026

    @EdwardBlair
    Author

    So the review process does work fairly if you have a sufficient justification, I briefly mentioned what I was doing and what I think triggered it. I of course have no insight into the process.

    Maybe sacrifice a couple of sticks of RAM or a GPU and pray the AI forgives you

  12. EdwardBlair commented on Sep 15, 2026

    @EdwardBlair
    Author

    I'm getting a couple more refusals today on daybreak blue latest high

    This content can't be shown
    We take extra caution with cybersecurity requests. If you’re a security professional, you may be able to apply for Trusted Access.
    Trusted Access: https://chatgpt.com/cyber/
    Learn more: https://help.openai.com/en/articles/20001326

    On exactly the same projects I've been working on for weeks without issue

  13. EdwardBlair commented on Sep 15, 2026

    @EdwardBlair
    Author

    This is consistent now

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