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72 changes: 37 additions & 35 deletions data_sources/sysmon_eventid_15.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
name: Sysmon EventID 15
id: 95785e02-93b4-47e2-81f1-be326295348e
version: 4
version: 5
creation_date: '2024-05-22'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
modification_date: '2026-10-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
description: Logs the creation of a new file stream, including details about the file stream's hash, path, and associated process metadata.
mitre_components:
Expand All @@ -22,43 +22,11 @@ supported_TA:
version: 5.0.1
fields:
- _time
- action
- Channel
- Computer
- Contents
- CreationUtcTime
- EventChannel
- EventCode
- EventData_Xml
- EventDescription
- EventID
- EventRecordID
- Guid
- Hash
- IMPHASH
- Image
- Keywords
- Level
- MD5
- Name
- Opcode
- ProcessGuid
- ProcessID
- ProcessId
- RecordID
- RecordNumber
- RuleName
- SHA256
- SecurityID
- SystemTime
- System_Props_Xml
- TargetFilename
- Task
- ThreadID
- TimeCreated
- UserID
- UtcTime
- Version
- action
- date_hour
- date_mday
- date_minute
Expand All @@ -70,33 +38,66 @@ fields:
- dest
- dvc_nt_host
- event_id
- EventChannel
- EventCode
- EventData_Xml
- EventDescription
- EventID
- EventRecordID
- eventtype
- file_create_time
- file_hash
- file_name
- file_path
- Guid
- Hash
- host
- id
- Image
- IMPHASH
- index
- Keywords
- Level
- linecount
- MD5
- Name
- Opcode
- os
- process_exec
- process_guid
- process_id
- process_name
- process_path
- ProcessGuid
- ProcessId
- ProcessID
- punct
- RecordID
- RecordNumber
- RuleName
- SecurityID
- SHA256
- signature
- signature_id
- source
- sourcetype
- splunk_server
- System_Props_Xml
- SystemTime
- tag
- tag::eventtype
- TargetFilename
- Task
- ThreadID
- TimeCreated
- timeendpos
- timestartpos
- user
- user_id
- UserID
- UtcTime
- vendor_product
- Version
output_fields:
- dest
- dvc
Expand All @@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ output_fields:
- process_path
- signature
- signature_id
- user
- user_id
- vendor_product
example_log: <Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>15</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>15</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2021-04-28T20:11:34.709744300Z'/><EventRecordID>667860</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='1952' ThreadID='2428'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>project-mumbai-host</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2021-04-28 20:11:34.709</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{ED2ECF8A-C154-6089-F967-00000000BB01}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>7000</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Roaming\Telegram Desktop\Telegram.exe</Data><Data Name='TargetFilename'>C:\Users\DefaultAccount\Downloads\Telegram Desktop\Good(NLA).txt:Zone.Identifier</Data><Data Name='CreationUtcTime'>2021-04-28 20:11:33.238</Data><Data Name='Hash'>MD5=C785C55D5FA3443A11B8417209C4B524,SHA256=D07777E0DC36EBECCE3FA9644F0F44DC4A0B7EDE0CBC1F5D33E8D6CB07AF5B5C,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000</Data><Data Name='Contents'>[ZoneTransfer] ZoneId=3 </Data></EventData></Event>
65 changes: 33 additions & 32 deletions data_sources/sysmon_eventid_22.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
name: Sysmon EventID 22
id: 911538b2-eba7-4d3e-85e8-d82d380c37bf
version: 4
version: 5
creation_date: '2024-05-22'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
modification_date: '2026-10-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
description: Logs DNS query events, including details about the queried domain, source IP, query type, and response data.
mitre_components:
Expand All @@ -24,36 +24,6 @@ fields:
- _time
- Channel
- Computer
- EventChannel
- EventCode
- EventData_Xml
- EventDescription
- EventID
- EventRecordID
- Guid
- Image
- Keywords
- Level
- Name
- Opcode
- ProcessGuid
- ProcessID
- ProcessId
- QueryName
- QueryResults
- QueryStatus
- RecordID
- RecordNumber
- RuleName
- SecurityID
- SystemTime
- System_Props_Xml
- Task
- ThreadID
- TimeCreated
- UserID
- UtcTime
- Version
- date_hour
- date_mday
- date_minute
Expand All @@ -64,30 +34,61 @@ fields:
- date_zone
- dvc_nt_host
- event_id
- EventChannel
- EventCode
- EventData_Xml
- EventDescription
- EventID
- EventRecordID
- eventtype
- Guid
- host
- id
- Image
- index
- Keywords
- Level
- linecount
- Name
- Opcode
- process_exec
- process_guid
- process_name
- ProcessGuid
- ProcessId
- ProcessID
- punct
- query
- query_count
- QueryName
- QueryResults
- QueryStatus
- record_type
- RecordID
- RecordNumber
- reply_code_id
- RuleName
- SecurityID
- signature
- signature_id
- source
- sourcetype
- splunk_server
- src
- System_Props_Xml
- SystemTime
- tag
- tag::eventtype
- Task
- ThreadID
- TimeCreated
- timeendpos
- timestartpos
- user_id
- UserID
- UtcTime
- vendor_product
- Version
output_fields:
- answer
- answer_count
Expand Down
50 changes: 35 additions & 15 deletions detections/cloud/asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,27 +1,47 @@
name: ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User
id: 886a8f46-d7e2-4439-b9ba-aec238e31732
version: 12
version: 13
creation_date: '2024-05-22'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects unauthorized container uploads to AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR) by monitoring AWS CloudTrail events. It identifies instances where a new container is uploaded by a user not previously recognized as authorized. This detection is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate a potential compromise or misuse of AWS ECR, which could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data or the deployment of malicious containers. By identifying and investigating these events, organizations can mitigate the risk of data breaches or other security incidents resulting from unauthorized container uploads. The impact of such an attack could be significant, compromising the integrity and security of the organization's cloud environment.
description: |-
The following analytic detects unauthorized container uploads to AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR) by monitoring AWS CloudTrail events.
It identifies instances where a new container is uploaded by a user not previously recognized as authorized.
data_source:
- ASL AWS CloudTrail
search: |-
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users_asl`
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
`amazon_security_lake`
api.operation=PutImage
NOT `aws_ecr_users_asl`

| fillnull

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime

by actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent
src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region

| rename actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account
actor.user.uid as user
api.operation as action
api.service.name as dest
cloud.provider as vendor_product
cloud.region as vendor_region
http_request.user_agent as user_agent
src_endpoint.ip as src

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: |-
No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/
drilldown_searches:
Expand All @@ -38,7 +58,7 @@ intermediate_findings:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: Container uploaded from unknown user $user$
message: Container uploaded from unknown user [$user$].
threat_objects:
- field: src
type: ip_address
Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
name: Windows Cloud Files Filter Loaded by Uncommon Process
id: 77b85062-274e-43a5-9dab-c25862b85291
version: 1
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-18'
modification_date: '2026-10-08'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
The following analytic detects cldapi.dll being loaded by a process not associated with legitimate cloud sync activity.
The following analytic detects "cldapi.dll" being loaded by a process not associated with legitimate cloud sync activity.
The Windows Cloud Files API (cldapi.dll) is abused by several local privilege escalation exploits.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 7
Expand All @@ -16,22 +16,25 @@ search: |-
EventID=7
ImageLoaded="*\\cldapi.dll"
NOT Image IN (
"*\\box.exe",
"*\\dropbox.exe",
"*\\googledrivefs.exe",
"*\\icloud.exe",
"*\\onedrive*.exe",
"*\\Windows\\explorer.exe"
"*\\Windows\\System32\\*",
"*\\Windows\\Syswow64\\*",
"*\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*"
"*\\box.exe",
"*\\dropbox.exe",
"*\\googledrivefs.exe",
"*\\icloud.exe",
"*\\onedrive*.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Syswow64\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*"
)

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by Computer ImageLoaded EventID dest loaded_file loaded_file_path process_exec
process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path
service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature_id user_id
vendor_product

by dest loaded_file_path loaded_file
process_path process_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id
service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified
signature signature_id user_id vendor_product

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_cloud_files_filter_loaded_by_uncommon_process_filter`
Expand All @@ -57,7 +60,10 @@ intermediate_findings:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: Cloud Files Filter ($ImageLoaded$) loaded by suspicious process $Image$ on $dest$
message: Cloud Files Filter [$loaded_file_path$] loaded by suspicious process [$process_path$] on [$dest$]
threat_objects:
- field: loaded_file_path
type: loaded_file
Comment thread
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analytic_story:
- RedSun
- BlueHammer
Expand Down
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